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Meeting Competition in Good Faith,
and the "Premium" Product
Arthur D. Austin*
T HE BROAD PURPOSE of the Robinson-Patman Act' is to pro-
hibit sellers from granting price allowances, and other
specified benefits which give competitive advantage to a pur-
chaser and also discriminate against his competitors. 2 It came
into existence largely because the Clayton Act3 had proven
ineffective4 in dealing with the chain store,5 which made sizeable
capital investments "in facilities for performing bulk storage,
redelivery, and financing, so as to 'integrate' the retailing and
wholesaling functions . . . and to eliminate middleman profits
by dealing with the manufacturer directly." c The claims gener-
ated such concern among the independents that they demanded
and obtained legislative relief.7 Whether the Robinson-Patman
Act neutralizes the economic power of the large chains is a
question that has provoked heated controversy." However, there
can be no argument that its application has given rise to many
problems for businessmen and their legal advisors. The Act
* Asst. Prof., Dept. of Bus. Admin., Bowling Green State Univ.; member of
the Virginia Bar.
1 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1952).
2 See Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 43 (1948);
H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1935); Sawyer, Business Aspects of Pricing Under the
Robinson-Patman Act 15-88 (1963).
3 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13
(1952).
4 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 346
U. S. 61, 64 (1953); Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman
Act 6-7 (1962); Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 6 (1959).
5 See F. T. C., Chain Stores: Growth and Development of Chain Stores, S.
Doc. No. 100, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 55, 80-81 (1932); F. T. C., Final Report on
Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1 Sess. 51, 96-97 (1935).
6 Rowe, supra note 4, at 4.
7 Rowe, Id. at 11-17. See also Stocking, Workable Competition and Anti-
trust Policy 222-23 (1961).
8 For critical views of the Robinson-Patman Act see Blum, The Robinson-
Patman Act-An Introduction to Uncertainty, 35 Conn. B. J. (1961); Rowe,
Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robin-
son-Patman, 60 Yale L. J. 929 (1951); Simon, Price Discrimination to Meet
Competition, 1950 U. Ill. L. F. 575. In defense of the Act and for a general
summary of its purposes see Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-
Patman Act (1963).
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has been labeled a "hodgepodge" ) and "one of the most tortuous
legislative pronouncements ever to go on the statute books." 10
However, an alleged violator can assert either of two de-
fenses: "cost justification," 11 or "meeting competition in good
faith." The latter defense reads as follows:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint
under this section, that there has been discrimination in price
or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting
the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification
shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this
section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively
shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order
terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting
the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower
price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any pur-
chaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities
furnished by a competitor. (Emphasis supplied.) 12
The Premium Product
Although the Robinson-Patman version of the "meeting
competition in good faith defense" [hereinafter referred to as
the Section 2(b) defense] was intended to eliminate the alleged
deficiencies 13 of similar language in the Clayton Act, its appli-
cation has provoked sharp controversy. Its efficacy as a legally
coherent defensive maneuver has been questioned many times,' 4
9 80 Cong. Rec. 9419 (1936).
10 Dirlam and Kahn, Fair Competition, The Law and Economics of Anti-
trust Policy 119 (1954).
11 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a)(1958). See generally Fuchs, The Requirement of Exactness in the Justifi-
cation of Price and Service Differentials Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
30 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1951); Sawyer, Accounting and Statistical Proof in Price
Discrimination Cases, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 244 (1951); Shniderman, Cost Justifi-
cation Under the Robinson-Patman Act-The FTC Advisory Committee's
Report, 25 Cinn. L. Rev. 389 (1956).
12 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(b)
(1958).
13 Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U. S. 231, 241-42
(1951). See H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1936).
14 See, e.g., Hall and Phillips, Good Faith, Discrimination and Market Or-
ganization, 30 So. Eco. J. 144 (1963); Simon, Price Discrimination to Meet
Competition, 1950 U. Ill. L. F. 575; Tarpry, What About the Good Faith
Defense? 25 J. Marketing 62 (1960); The Robinson-Patman "Good Faith"
Defense: New Departure, Revitalization, or Mere Strengthening? 31 Cinn.
L. Rev. 296 (1962); The Good Faith Defense of the Robinson-Patman Act: A
New Restriction Appraised, 66 Yale L. J. 935 (1957).
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and the scarcity of appellate review1 '5 of Section 2 (b) has com-
pounded the problem of application. On the other hand, during
the twenty-nine years that this defense has been available, broad
areas of interpretation have crystallized into definite guide-
lines. 10 But the dichotomy between the original intentions of
the Section 2 (b) proviso and the pricing policies that the courts
allow has been widening. 17
About the same time as the rise of the chain store and the
passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, the nation's economy finally
passed from a somewhat competitive structure to that of oligop-
oly.1 s The latter is now "the major type of market structure
found in American industry, and it is also found in transporta-
tion, finance, and other fields." 19 This means that "a few large
sellers account collectively for the whole or major part of pro-
15 The U. S. Supreme Court has been squarely faced with the Section 2(b)
defense only four times: Federal Trade Commission v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U. S.
505 (1963); Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U. S. 396
(1958); Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U. S. 231 (1951);
Federal Trade Commission v. Staley Manufacturing Co., 324 U. S. 746
(1945).
16 Section 2(b) is effective against a Section 2(a) violation. Standard Oil
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U. S. 231 (1951). It is not a defense
against Section 2(c). Federal Trade Commission v. Washington Fish and
Oyster Co., 271 F. 2d 39 (9th Cir. 1959). It has been held to be a good de-
fense against a Section 2(d) violation in Shulton, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 305 F. 2d 36 (7th Cir. 1962), but the Commission came to a
different conclusion in Re Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F. T. C. 1535 (1956).
The Section 2(b) defense is good against Section 2(e). Ludwig v. American
Greeting Corp., 282 F. 2d 917 (6th Cir. 1960). It is good against Section
2(f). Mid-South Distributors v. Federal Trade Commission, 287 F. 2d 512
(5th Cir. 1961).
17 Among the many problems as yet not satisfactorily resolved are: 1. The
difficulty involved in identifying a pricing system. See Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U. S. 396 (1958). 2. Is meeting competition
in good faith compatible with attracting new customers? See Sunshine
Biscuits, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 306 F. 2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
3. How much knowledge of a competitor's pricing policy is necessary in
order to effectively raise the Section 2(b) defense? See Balian Ice Cream
Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F. 2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955); Forster Mfg. Co.,
Inc., Docket 7207, Trade Reg. Rep. f16,243 (1963). 4. Must the accused
violator establish that he was meeting a lawful price? See Standard Oil Co.
v. Brown, 238 F. 2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956). See generally Edwards, The Price
Discrimination Law (1959).
For efforts to amend the Robinson-Patman Act see Strengthening
Robinson-Patman Act and Amending Antitrust Law Prohibiting Price Dis-
crimination, S. Rep. 2010, 85 Cong. 2 Sess. 1-2 (1957).
18 See generally Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition
(1948).
19 Carter and Snavely, Intermediate Economic Analysis 76 (1961). A classic
example of oligopoly is discussed in American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U. S. 781 (1946). This case has added significance since it reflects an
attempt to harmonize the law of monopoly with oligopoly. See Nicholls,
The Tobacco Case of 1946, 39 Am. Econ. Rev. 284 (1949).
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duction and sales" in a given industry.20 It also means that the
products offered for sale by the three or four dominant sup-
pliers take on similar characteristics, i.e., they are standardized
or at least somewhat interchangeable. With an industry-wide
similarity of products, manufacturers are faced with the prob-
lem of distinguishing their items from those offered by competi-
tors.2 1 Such attempts are commonly known as "product dif-
ferentiation." 22 An effective method of establishing product dif-
ferentiation is through the use of various promotional techniques,
such as distinctive packaging.23
As a result of the emphasis on product differentiation, prod-
ucts which are essentially the same can receive different con-
sumer reaction.2 4 This variance in consumer response is most
often manifested by one product selling at a higher price than
a competitor's item. This price differential between two com-
peting items is often expressed by labeling the lower priced as
regular and the higher priced as premium.
Problems Posed by the Premium Product
The Robinson-Patman Act aims at overall equality of mar-
ket opportunity for both purchasers and sellers.25 Generally
speaking, where "commodities of like grade and quality" 26 are
20 National Industrial Conference Board, Antitrust in an Expanding Econ-
omy 10 (1962). See Carter and Snavely, supra note 19, at 214-46. For a
refined and comprehensive analysis of oligopoly see Fellner, Competition
Among the Few (1949). See also Kaysen and Turner, Antitrust Policy, An
Economic and Legal Analysis 27 (1959).
21 For articles dealing with the problems of reconciling antitrust laws with
the contemporary economy see Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation:
Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1139
(1952); Smith, Effective Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing the Anti-
trust Laws, 26 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 405 (1951).
22 "Product differentiation is propagated by differences in the design or
physical quality of competing products by efforts of sellers to distinguish
their products through packaging, branding, and the offering of auxiliary
services to buyers, and by advertising and sales promotional efforts designed
to win the allegiance and custom of the potential buyer." Bain, Barriers to
New Competition 114 (1956).
23 The impact of effective packaging has been judicially recognized: "With
increasing standardization of products generally, consumer appeal through
attractive packaging has become a developing aspect of competitive activity."
Gerber Products Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916, 922
(S. D. N. Y. 1958).
24 See Lippincott and Margulies, Packaging in Top Level Planning, Harv.
Bus. Rev. 46 (Sept.-Oct. 1956).
25 See note 2, supra.
26 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a)
(1958).
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involved, a seller cannot charge one customer less than he
charges another similarly situated customer.2 7 On the other
hand, as has been pointed out, the Act allows a price reduction
to be made so as to meet "an equally low price of a competitor."
But these words do not indicate the degree of product re-
semblance and similarity that is envisioned in the "good faith
meeting of competition" defense. There is no mention of guide-
line words such as "like grade and quality." 28 Hence the cru-
cial question is-what type of product similarity between com-
petitors is required by Section 2(b)?
This question is significant when a premium product is
pitted against a lower priced regular product. Thus, suppose
a seller with a "premium" product reduces his prices to the level
of those of a competitor with a "regular" item? Has he met
competition in good faith or has he, as a practical matter, under-
cut 29 the prices of his competitor? Rowe states the problems in
the following manner:
• . . a price quotation for a heavily advertised national brand
or product of superior quality which nominally matches
the price of an unknown entity or "dog" can in reality
undercut it in the market place.3 0
If price discrimination exists when "premium" product price
levels are the same as the "regular" product levels, it means that
a penalty is attached to the firm which is able to stimulate strong
consumer backing for its product. Of course before any con-
27 Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Brands, 189 F. 2d 510 (2d Cir.
1951).
28 Although the "like grade and quality" requirement is applicable only to
the seller's own products sold at different prices and not to a comparison
between competitor's goods there is no reason why the same definitions
should not also apply to the § 2 (b) defense and the premium-regular product
conflict. For support of this attitude see Borden Co. v. F. T. C., 1964 Trade
Reg. Rep. 71,308. See generally Rowe, Price Differentials and Product
Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 Yale L. J. 1
(1956); Cassady and Grether, The Proper Interpretation of "Like Grade
and Quality" Within the Meaning of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 30 So. Calif. L. Rev. 241 (1957).
29 The Section 2 (b) proviso does not protect an accused violator who under-
cuts his competitor's prices. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
340 U. S. 231 (1951); Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block and
Gravel Co., 269 F. 2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959); Gerber Products Co. v. Beech-
Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916, 921 (S. D. N. Y. 1958); Federal
Trade Commission v. Standard Brands, 189 F. 2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951);
Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 148 F. 2d 378 (2d Cir.
1948).
30 Rowe, supra note 4, at 242.
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clusions can be drawn, the major problem is identification: if
two products contain essentially the same ingredients and have
similar qualities except for externals, how can one be identified
as "premium"? Then, assuming that the premium item can be
identified (a tenuous assumption at best), a price differential
that realistically reflects the actual market distance between the
regular and premium items must be established.
Identification of the Premium Product
Any worthwhile endeavor to reconcile the Section 2(b) de-
fense with the so-called premium product must necessarily begin
with a judicial announcement that two products selling at dif-
ferent prices have sufficiently similar qualities so that it can be
said that they are being marketed on the same competitive level.
Hence the price reduction of one of the products affects the
competitive position of the other. The market place environ-
ment for such an announcement would ordinarily include three
factors: (1) a price spread between two "competing" products;
(2) a reduction in price of the higher priced item to a level at or
near the competition's prices; (3) an allegation by the seller of
the lower priced item that his prices have been undercut. If
the court recognizes the presence of an established price dif-
ferential below which the seller of the higher priced product
cannot go and still retain the protection of the Section 2 (b) pro-
viso, it means that the existence of the premium product has
been acknowledged. But the question still remains: how do
courts in fact identify a premium product? 31
The only thorough analysis of the premium product rami-
fications of Section 2 (b) by the courts is in Gerber Products Co.
v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc. 3 2 The facts can be summarized
as follows: Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc. is a baby food seller
who marketed their products in glass containers. A competitor
in the California market, Gerber Products Company, packaged
its baby food in tin containers. Glass-contained baby food sold
at a higher price than the same item packaged in tin. When
31 The problem of the "premium" product is restricted to alleged violations
of Section 2(a) which reads in part as follows: "That it shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect
of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition ..
32 160 F. Supp. 916 (S. D, N. Y. 1958).
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Beech-Nut first entered the California market they commanded
around 5 per cent of the baby food market in that state. They
ultimately increased this to a peak of 6.6 per cent. Gerber's
share of the market was around 75 per cent.3 3 Subsequent to its
6.6 per cent peak, Beech-Nut's share began to decline, eventually
reaching a low of 4.3 per cent. At this point Beech-Nut, con-
fronted with what they interpreted as possible market extinc-
tion, reduced prices to match those charged by Gerber. There-
after a series of price reductions by both Beech-Nut and Gerber
prevailed until Gerber instituted action 34 under the Robinson-
Patman Act. The Court immediately perceived that the intrin-
sic problem involved in the conflict was a price contest between
"premium" and "regular" products. Judge Weinfeld summarized
the issues by saying:
At the outset it should be noted that neither party
makes any substantial claim that the food content of its
product is superior to or more costly than the other's. How-
ever, each urges, and has stressed in its advertising, that its
container has qualities not possessed by the other. Thus the
hard core of the controversy revolves about the packaging
of their respective products-tin against glass containers.35
In suggesting that the protection of the Section 2 (b) de-
fense36 was inapplicable because of the premium status of
Beech-Nut's baby food, Gerber advanced an argument that, al-
though necessary to their case, illuminates the complexities in-
volved in making a distinction between premium and regular
products. It was alleged that "marketwise the products are not
comparable." 37 There is a certain amount of inconsistency in
this argument. Apparently Gerber did feel that Beech-Nut's
33 The baby food market is a classic example of oligopoly. Gerber con-
trolled more than 47% of the national market, Beech-Nut had 21%, while
Heinz and Company had around 16.5% of the total market. In other words,
three sellers controlled around 85% of the national market. 160 F. Supp. at
917.
34 The Court was actually confronted with Gerber's motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction ordering Beech-Nut to raise its prices so as to reach the
price differential that had existed between the competing products before
September 4, 1957. 160 F. Supp. at 917.
35 160 F. Supp. at 919.
36 In hearings before the Commission whether the § 2(b) defense has been
established is a fact question to be resolved by that body. Federal Trade
Commission v. A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 324 U. S. 746 (1945). In a
civil action for damages the jury resolves the facts. Atlas Bldg. Products
Co. v. Diamond Block and Gravel Co., 269 F. 2d 950 (10th Cir., 1959).
37 160 F. Supp. at 920.
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baby food was sufficiently "comparable" so that it was being
marketed on the same competitive level as their products. More-
over, the products were "comparable" enough so that when
Beech-Nut reduced their prices to Gerber's level, the latter felt
that it was necessary to protest that their prices had been
undercut. This then is the conundrum that is produced by the
attempt to reconcile the language of the Section 2 (b) proviso
with the blurred distinction made between "regular" and
"premium" products. 38 How different can products be and still
be similar as far as Section 2 (b) is concerned?
However, the Court was not primarily concerned with the
possible theoretical inconsistencies that might flow from the
plaintiff's pleadings. Instead the court directed its attention to
determining whether the fact situation actually did involve a con-
frontation between regular and premium products. This neces-
sarily involved a finding39 that a premium product existed. And
the method by which the identification of a premium item can
be made was stated as follows: "The ultimate test. . . is whether
a substantial part of the public is prepared to pay a greater price
for the glass contained product." (Emphasis supplied.) 40 In
other words, if the public is willing, whatever the reason, to pay
a higher price for one item than for another, the higher priced
product has premium status! 41
The main attraction of the "public acceptance" test is its ap-
parent simplicity. But such simplicity is deceptive because of the
abstract quality of its language. Movement from the general to
the particular always generates problems. Moreover, viewed
strictly from a pragmatic viewpoint, significant questions remain
unanswered. For example, how long must the public be willing
38 See note 30, supra and accompanying text.
39 The Court resolved the immediate issue confronting them (the case was
never decided on its merits) in favor of the defendant on the following
grounds: 1. doubt as to the existence of a premium product; 2. lack of suf-
ficient proof of irreparable injury that is necessary for the granting of the
extraordinary relief desired by Gerber; 3. the dominant market position
occupied by Gerber in California; 4. lack of proof that competition would
be lessened or that Gerber would be eliminated from the California market.
40 160 F. Supp. at 922.
41 It is interesting to note that the "ultimate test" as stated by Judge Wien-
feld parallels his summary of Gerber's argument. "It [Gerber] argues that
despite higher prices for glass packed baby food many consumers prefer to
buy it because of a belief (right or wrong) that its contents are better pre-
served and of greater nutritional value-that in effect, it is a premium
product which commands a higher price in competition with tin." 160 F.
Supp. at 920.
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to pay "a greater price" before a product can be said to be
premium? Certainly any meaningful answer to this question
would depend on the facts, such as the type of product, the
complexion of the industry, the actions of competitors, the pos-
sible attempts of a new competitor to enter the market, and
the overall behavior of the economy. In addition, the test does
not acknowledge, except perhaps by implication, the degree of
control that a firm can exert in respect to public acceptance of
its products.
On the other hand, Judge Wienfeld did expressly exclude
advertising from his test even though it is used by nearly all firms
to shape and encourage consumer acceptance of their products.
In the contemporary business world, advertising has a major
role in determining commercial success of a given venture.4 2
Yet when prefacing its statement of the public acceptance test,
the court indicated that merely because Beech-Nut "in its ad-
vertising 'puffs' the alleged virtue of glass containers [such
action] does not make it a premium product as against tin-any
more than plaintiff's advertising claim of unique qualities of tin
make its product a premium product." 48 To exclude the market
consequences of advertising from any type of test has some at-
tractive advantages. Possibly the central advantage is the avoid-
ance of the difficulty in accurately measuring and gauging the
effect advertising has on the consumer's buying habits.44 How-
ever, packaging is a form of advertisement.4 5 Therefore, to ex-
clude advertising 6 and simultaneously to acknowledge that
packaging does play a paramount role in influencing the con-
sumer 47 seems to be a rather obvious contradiction. Public ac-
ceptance of a given product represents the totality of many and
varied influences4S upon the consumer. One of these influences
42 In 1900 the volume of both national and local advertising expenditures
was estimated at $542,000. By 1959 it had increased to an estimated figure
of $11,090,000. Frey, Advertising 22 (1961). See also Borden, The Economic
Effects of Advertising (1942).
43 160 F. Supp. at 922.
44 See Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 244, 45
(1962).
45 See note 24, supra.
46 160 F. Supp. at 922.
47 Ibid.
48 Among some of the more pronounced influences operating on the con-
sumer are his economic position, his ethnic background, his education, and
the impact of external forces such as his particular "reference group."
Sept., 1965
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certainly is advertising. Hence it can be argued with some
cogency that effective advertising can create a "premium" 'prod-
uct.
The "public acceptance" test announced in Gerber Products
was nothing more than the articulation of the general attitude
toward the premium product that had already been promulgated
by the Federal Trade Commission. When the Standard Oil case
was remanded 4 9 with instructions to make findings in conformity
with the Supreme Court's opinion, the Commission ° was faced
with resolving a price war between a major brand of gasoline
and a non-major brand.51 In a peripheral discussion5 2 the Com-
mission said that "in the retail distribution of gasoline public ac-
ceptance rather than chemical analysis of the product is the im-
portant competitive factor." (Emphasis supplied.) 13 However,
unlike the court in the Gerber case, the Commission did acknowl-
edge the impact of advertising by saying that "well advertised
brands of gasoline have come to be known as major brands .. ." 54
Furthermore, the Commission expressly recognized that factors
other than the ingredients of the product play the prominent role
in defining public acceptance.
The dealer's overall success or failure may be gov-
erned largely by the extent to which his merchandise is ac-
ceptable to the public, and in the case of gasoline public ac-
ceptance is determined in large measure by factors other
than actual grade and quality. (Emphasis supplied.) 55
49 340 U. S. 231 (1951). This decision gave the § 2(b) defense full sub-
stantive force. See generally McGee, Price Discrimination and Competitive
Effects: the Standard Oil of Indiana Case, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 398 (1956).
50 In the Matter of Standard Oil Co., 49 F. T. C. 923 (1953).
51 The distinction between so-called major and non-major brands of gaso-
line is not always clear. In the Matter of American Oil Co., 60 F. T. C.
1786 (1962), Commissioner Elman, dissenting, states the problem as fol-
lows: "How was respondent in October, 1958 to know that 'Paraland,' owned
by a 'major' producer (Phillips), would be regarded by the Commission in
June 1962 as a 'private' brand entitled, apparently as a matter law, to a
'normal' differential of 2 cents a gallon lower than 'major' brands?" 60
F. T. C. at 1825.
52 The Commission concluded that Standard Oil had violated § 2(a) in that
price discrimination had been made pursuant to an established system. It
was also concluded that the burden of proof necessary for the § 2 (b) defense
had "not been sustained." 49 F. T. C. at 955. The Court of Appeals vacated
the order of the F. T. C. and held that the § 2 (b) defense had been made
out. 233 F. 2d 649 (1956), affirmed, Federal Trade Commission v. Standard
Oil Co., 355 U. S. 396 (1958).
53 49 F. T. C. at 952.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
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Apparently, almost every industry is susceptible to the di-
vision between regular and premium products.5" In con-
demning Anheuser-Busch for reducing prices in St. Louis of its
nationally known Budweiser beer to the level of brands only
known on a regional basis, the Commission again indicated a
commitment to the public acceptance theory by stating:
The test in such a case is not necessarily a difference in
quality but the fact that the public is willing to buy the
product at a higher price in a normal market. Clearly,
therefore, respondent's reduction from the premium price to
match the prices of the regional beers on the market was
not a meeting of competition. The effect was to undercut
competition.
5 7
The use of public acceptance as a means of identifying the
premium product has been firmly established.58 The Gerber
Products case is undoubtedly the most precise articulation of
the "public acceptance" test. But because there has been no at-
tempt to define and delineate the forces that operate within and
inspire "public acceptance," it is impossible to forecast accurately
whether a given product is, or is not, "premium." This in-
adequacy is due to the fact that, with the possible exception of
the Gerber6 9 case, there have been no cases that have given a
meaningful analysis of the premium product as it relates to the
Section 2(b) proviso.
Effect of a Reduction in Price of a Premium Product
Suppose an alleged violator relies upon the Section 2(b)
defense when it has been established that his product is "pre-
mium." Can he successfully allege "meeting competition in good
56 In addition to gasoline and baby food the distinction between premium
and regular products has been applied to temperature controls, In the Mat-
ter of Minneapolis-Honeywell, 44 F. T. C. 351 (1948); beer, In the Matter of
Anheuser-Busch, 54 F. T. C. 277 (1957); bakers yeast, Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F. 2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951). This list is by
no means exhaustive of the products to which the distinction has been
made.
57 In the Matter of Anheuser-Busch, 54 F. T. C. 277, 302 (1957), set aside,
Anheuser-Busch v. Federal Trade Commission, 289 F. 2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
58 E.g., Gerber Products Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916
(S. D. N. Y. 1958); In the Matter of Anheuser-Busch, 54 F. T. C. 277 (1957),
set aside, Anheuser-Busch v. Federal Trade Commission, 289 F. 2d 835 (7th
Cir. 1961); In the Matter of Standard Oil Co., 49 F. T. C. 923 (1953), set
aside, Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 233 F. 2d 649 (7th
Cir. 1956), afirmed, 355 U. S. 396 (1958).
59 The force of the Gerber case is weakened by the fact that the conflict
was never resolved on the merits.
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faith" when he reduces his prices near to, or even with, a com-
petitor's "regular" product? The answer is an unequivocal "no."
It is well settled that such action constitutes undercutting the
prices of a competitor.6 0 The cases most often cited for this view
are Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.61
and the more recently decided Federal Trade Commission v.
Standard Brands, Inc.62 The former case, decided under Section 13
of the Clayton Act,63 involved the premium "Lucky Strikes" cig-
arettes competing against a regional "regular" cigarette manufac-
tured in Puerto Rico. There was an established price differential
of 3 cents-"Lucky Strikes" sold at 15 cents per pack while the
regular item sold at 12 cents. The charge of price discrimination
was generated by the defendant's lowering the price of "Lucky
Strikes" to 12 cents per pack.64 It was held that this action did
not constitute meeting competition in good faith 5 because
"Lucky Strikes" was a much more expensive cigarette than ap-
pellee's brand, and, if sold at a low or lower price, it would be
practically impossible for a weaker competition to continue. 66
The failure of the court in this case to expand on the reasons for
60 Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F. 2d
234 (2d Cir. 1929); Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Brands, 189 F. 2d
510 (2d Cir. 1951); In the Matter of Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
44 F. T. C, 351 (1948); In the Matter of American Oil Co., 60 F. T. C. 1786
(1962); Callaway Mills Co., 37 Trade Reg. Rep. f1f6800 (F. T. C. Feb. 10,
1964).
Question. If the equally low price of a competitor applies to goods that
normally sell at a lower price than that normally applicable to goods offered
by the person charged, because of ... less acceptance or different packaging,
may such lower price be met in good faith?
Opinion. The usefulness of the good-faith defense in such a situation is
doubtful. The Federal Trade Commission, on a remand of the Standard
Oil Co. case, held that because of such circumstances the Standard Oil Co.
was not in good faith in meeting the lower price or lower cost and grade of
gasoline. Consequently, the Commission held that the good-faith defense
was not made out. The Court of Appeals set aside the Commission's order
to cease and desist based on that reason. The Supreme Court of the United
States affirmed the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Pat-
man, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 96 (1963). See also
Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 552-54 (1959).
61 30 F. 2d 234 (1929).
62 189 F. 2d 510 (1951).
63 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13
(1952). See note 13, supra.
64 The plaintiff retaliated by lowering prices to 10 cents per pack.
65 30 F. 2d 234 (1929).
66 Ibid. The Court seemed impressed with the fact that the defendant ap-
peared to be "punishing" the plaintiff for not joining them in a campaign to
prevent the enactment of new and higher tax legislation in Puerto Rico.
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its conclusions dilutes its significance as authority. However, in
the Standard case a more meaningful statement of purpose for
requiring the maintenance of a price distance between premium
and regular products was advanced.
(c) For more than nine years prior to January 2, 1945,
respondent consistently sold bakers' yeast at prices higher
than those of most of its competitors and yet retained more
than 57% of the total volume of said yeast sold throughout
the United States. A competitive situation or condition was
thus established under which most competitors of respondent
could normally expect to sell and did sell bakers' yeast at
prices slightly below those of respondent. Also, buyers
normally expected to purchase, and did purchase, said
product from respondent at prices slightly in excess of those
paid most of its competitors. Under these conditions it was
unnecessary for respondent to meet or match exactly a lower
price of a competitor in order to retain business or to get
new business.6 7
Determination of a Normal Price Differential
Assuming that the "premium" product has been identified,
the next step is to determine a "normal" price distance between
the "premium" item and the competing "regular" item. The
"premium" product cannot be marketed below this differential
and still have the protection of the Section 2(b) defense.6 8 On
the other hand, if the seller of the regular item reduces his
prices below the normal differential, the premium seller should
be allowed to retaliate by lowering his prices so as to maintain the
spread.6 9
The main difficulty is in establishing this "normal" price dif-
ferential in such a manner that it will adequately reflect the
complexities of the market place. If a stable and unvarying dif-
ferential has prevailed for a long perod of time, for example
nine years,7 0 there is no real problem. However, prices in any
industry rarely remain completely static over extended periods
67 189 F. 2d at 514.
68 See note 60, supra.
69 The typical reaction would be to sue for treble damages. 49 Stat. 1526
(1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) (1952). E.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.,
348 U. S. 115 (1954). See generally Doyle, Treble Damages and Counsel
Fees, ABA Section of Antitrust Law Proceedings 142 (Aug. 1954); Clark,
The Treble Damage Bonanza, New Doctrines of Damages in Private Anti-
trust Suits, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 363 (1954).
70 See note 67, supra.
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of time. Instead, what often prevails is what one court labels
"a bouncing ball pricing policy," 71 and in many cases there is
a "nervous and erratic pattern of irregular prices." 72 Another
problem is that an ostensible price differential may not reflect the
true situation. For example, it has been pointed out that as the
result of the "practice of giving savings stamps, worth about one
cent a gallon, the actual spread exceeded the apparent differ-
ential." 73 Not in all cases can such a bonus to customers be
translated into specific monetary figures. Finally, there is al-
ways the possibility, admittedly remote, of the premium seller
purposely manipulating or artificially inflating the differential so
as to gain an advantage over his rivals.7 4
There is oblique authority75 to the effect that the premium
seller's share of the market is the determinative factor in estab-
lishing a normal differential. The "normal" price differential is
at that point where, if prices are reduced by the premium
seller, his share of the market begins to increase at the expense
of his competitors. Even excluding the paucity of authority for
this approach, it has obvious faults. What if there are periodic
token price reductions keyed to intensive advertising campaigns?
It would be impossible to determine if the increased share of
the market was attributable to advertising, a price reduction, or
both.
The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws has adopted a more flexible approach:
An inflexible cent-for-cent rule would enable a seller
of the preferred commodity in fact to undercut the price for
a less desirable product, or conversely, deprive the seller of
a less popular product of the full benefit of the "meeting
competition" defense. We therefore urge a flexible rule
which regards the nominal price of the rival product as
only a presumptive boundary of a seller's permissible price
reduction under the "meeting competition" proviso, adjust-
71 Sun Oil Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 294 F. 2d 465, 482 (5th
Cir., 1961), reversed, 371 U. S. 505 (1963).
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 "A supplier may well try to push his price for an established product to
a higher level, to exploit its supposed public acceptance, but then lose sales
to a more obscure rival-so as to refute popular preference at that spread
in price." Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 245
(1962).
75 Federal Trade Commission v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 541-42
(1960).
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss3/18
14 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
able up or down upon satisfactory proof by the person
questioning its reliability. In practical operation, such a test
in some circumstances necessarily must permit a seller of a
less accepted brand to cut substantially below the more
popular product's price. Conversely, as the Commission has
readily recognized, the seller of the premium commodity
sometimes must not go down to the price level of the lesser
product. In each case, the heart of the matter is whether
actual competition, not merely a nominal price quotation, is
equalized.7
Conclusion
There is no escaping the conclusion that in the contemporary
economy of this country there often exist discernible price dif-
ferences between products containing similar ingredients. This
is a reality of commercial life. And it is likewise true that "pub-
lic acceptance," purposely fostered by product differentiation,
frequently justifies designating one product "premium" while
another product is labeled "regular." Frequently the "premium"
and "regular" products are so similar that to allow the seller of
the higher priced item to reduce prices to the level of the regular
product would be inimical to the broad designs of the Robinson-
Patman Act and also to the particular purpose of the Section
2(b) proviso. The reason that this is not always the case is that
the premium item might possess certain qualities that substan-
tially alter the totality of the impression that it exerts in the
market place. Factors other than the chemical composition can
ccause a difference to exist between products. Sustained adver-
tising or attractive packaging, for example, can cloak a product
with a permanent image so far as the consumer is concerned.
And this image, although perhaps not susceptible to precise
measurement, has the net effect of erecting a substantial wall
between the "premium" and the "regular" product. Simply
stated, even though a chemical analysis of two products would
produce the same results, advertising, packaging, brand names,
etc., can have such "commercial significance" 77 as to preclude
market identity between them. In such situations the firm selling
the "premium" item should be given greater price policy free-
76 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-
trust Laws 184 (1955).
77 In Borden Co. v. FTC, 1964 Trade Reg. Rep., 71,308 the court held that
the brand name "Borden" had such "commercial significance" as to negate
the existence of "like grade and quality." Cf., Hartley and Parker Inc. v.
Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F. 2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962).
Sept., 1965
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1965
COMPETITION AND "PREMIUM" PRODUCT
dom-even to the extent of allowing a reduction of prices near
or to the level of the regular product.
In light of the above discussion it is recommended that
when a court is in the process of making a decision as to whether,
for Section 2(b) purposes, the "premium" and "regular" prod-
ucts are similar (which would necessitate maintaining a price
differential) or dissimilar (which would allow price policy free-
dom) the following factors should be considered:
1. The quality and length of the promotional campaign. If
the advertising is sustained and of high quality the chances are
enhanced that the image has crystallized into definite shape.
And the stronger the consumer image of a given product, the
greater the difference between it and other products.
2. Is the firm selling the premium product just entering
the market? Product differentiation in such situations is often
vital to the entrant seeking a toehold in a new market. To aid
the premium seller in gaining access into a new market is in
keeping with the grand purpose of all economic legislation,
i.e., to foster competition.
3. Would a refusal to allow the premium seller to lower
prices with the impunity provided by the Section 2(b) defense
stifle competition? If a reduction in price of a premium product
produces no adverse competitive effects, then it seems clear that
there is a vast dissimilarity between the premium and regular
product.
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